ABSTRACT In recent years, the chaos-based cryptographic algorithms have attracted a lot of attention. Specially, chaotic tent map (CTM)-based schemes show some good performances in randomness properties and security level. However, several shortcomings still can be found from them. In this paper, based on the security analysis of the pure CTM-based scheme, we propose a novel image encryption algorithm by using the combination of the rectangular transform and the CTM principle. It encrypts the three channels of the plain image at the same time, and these channel encryptions associate with each other. In addition, by generating the key streams related to both the secret keys and the plain image, its key-sensitivity has been further improved. The security of the proposed scheme has been verified by security analysis and experimental evaluations, and our results show that many drawbacks of pure CTM-based schemes have been overcome.
I. INTRODUCTION
As an important technology to protect digital images, image encryption has become an attractive research area in recent years. Due to some good features of chaotic systems, such as its extremely sensitive dependence on initial conditions and control parameters, ergodicity and random-like behaviours, more and more chaos-based image encryption algorithms have been proposed [1] - [9] .
Different chaos-based schemes use various chaotic systems. A three dimensional (3D) chaotic cat map is used to design a real-time secure symmetric encryption scheme in [10] , while the authors of [11] proposed a fast image encryption scheme by adopting the 3D chaotic baker maps. In [12] , two chaotic logistic maps with an external secret key are used for its algorithm design. Other alternatives, such as Bernoulli, valley maps and Chen chaotic system can also be found in the literature [13] - [15] . On the other hand, the security of chaos-based image encryption scheme usually depends on two aspects, namely the permutation and diffusion structures [16] . In the permutation phase, the pixel positions of the image are changed; while in the diffusion phase, the image's pixel values are changed. References [7] and [9] are good examples to demonstrate this point.
In [17] , the author made the initial attempt to adopt chaotic tent maps (CTM) for image encryption algorithm design. The basic idea of this CTM-based scheme is to utilize chaotic keystreams, which are generated by chaotic tent maps, to diffuse the plain image pixels by a simple exclusive-or (denoted as ⊕) operation. This system is so simple that its encryption speed is quite fast. As a consequence, it has advantages in dealing with large number of data and lessening redundant information, compared with the conventional image encryption algorithms. But some obvious defects can also be found in this pure CTM-based scheme as follows. First, this cryptosystem only involves the diffusing phase, and permutation structure has been omitted. Furthermore, when encrypting color images, this scheme simply encrypts each component of the color image respectively, which shows no adaptability from encrypting a gray image to a color one. In addition, as a vulnerability of this scheme, the CTM generated key-streams only relates to the secret keys. All these defects undermine its security level and make it is easy to be attacked by some common methods.
In this work, an improved algorithm, which is based on a rectangular transform (RT)-enhanced CTM system, has been proposed to overcome the defects of the pure CTM-based scheme. In addition to adding a permutation processing, this new scheme generates the key-streams which are not only related to the secret keys but the plain image. In other words, although the secret keys are the same, the key-streams are different when different plain images are encrypted, so that it can effectively resist the known plaintext attack (KPA) and chosen plaintext attack (CPA). As another novel design of this RT-enhance CTM scheme, when encrypting color images, it encrypts the three channels of the plain image at the same time and these channel encryptions associate with each other. More security and robust can be achieved from these designs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. After briefly reviews the pure CTM-based scheme proposed in [17] , in Section II we show its security defects by indicating some well-directed attacking methods. Following this, in Section III, the details of our RT-enhanced CRM algorithm, including encryption and decryption, are described. Some experimental results are given in Section IV. Section V discusses the security of the proposed scheme from different aspects via theoretic analysis, experiment evaluation and performance comparison with other schemes. Finally, we conclude this work by pointing out its practical value in Section VI.
II. THE PURE CTM-BASED ALGORITHM AND ITS DEFECTS

A. REVIEW OF THE PURE CTM-BASED ALGORITHM
As the pure CTM-based scheme only involves the confusion of the plain image pixels, we summarize its simple encryption steps as follows [17] . 1) Read the plain image P m×n×3 , where m and n are the size of the 2D color image, and we write N = 3mn. 2) Iterate CTM Equation (1) for N times with its control parameter µ and initial value x 0 to obtain the chaotic sequence x with the size N .
where x i ∈ [0, 1]. Note that when the parameter µ ∈ [0, 2] and the initial value x 0 ∈ (0, 1), the chaotic tent map transforms an interval [0, 1] into itself [17] . 3) Calculate the key stream S 1×N by using Equation (2) , then reshape S to obtain matrix M m×n×3 .
S = x × 10 10 mod 256.
4) Encrypt each pixel of image P by using M with ⊕ operation to obtain a cipher image C.
B. DEFECTS OF THE PURE CTM-BASED ALGORITHM
From its processing principle, some defects of its security can be found as follows.
1) VULNERABLE TO KPA
The KPA is a kind of attack method, which in based on the condition that the cryptanalyst possesses a serial of plaintext and their corresponding ciphertext. The cryptanalyst tries to find out a relationship between every pair of corresponding images or decrypt other ciphertext by using the gathered relationship. For the pure CTM-based scheme, let us denote the plaintext as P and its ciphertext as C, then matrix M = P ⊕ C can be obtained. now, if the attacker obtain another unauthorized ciphertext C , then he can easily reveal its corresponding plaintext P by computing P = M ⊕ C .
2) VULNERABLE TO CPA
Different form the KPA, the CPA happens when the cryptanalyst can temporarily use the encryption system. Some specific plaintext, which is chosen by the cryptanalyst, are send to the encryption machinery to obtain the corresponding ciphertext. Based on these plaintext-and-ciphertext pairs, some useful information about the encryption machinery could be compromised. For example, let us choose the plaintext P, which is an all zero matrix, and send it to the pure CTM-based encryption machinery, then its ciphertext C can be obtained. Thus, an matrix M = P ⊕ C can be computed to gain some insight of the encryption machinery of this scheme.
3) OTHER SECURITY PROBLEMS
In the pure CTM-based algorithm, a chaotic sequence x is obtained by iterating Equation (1) for N times with parameter µ and initial value x 0 . However, there are several values of x in the start stage may be not chaotic. This give this scheme a potential security risk. In addition, this scheme simply encrypts each component of the color image respectively, which shows no adaptability from encrypting a gray image to a color one.
III. RT-ENHANCED CTM ALGORITHM
As a theory preparation, we first introduce the two dimensional rectangular transform (2D-RT). Actually, the 2D-RT is an extension of the Arnold map and it can directly be used to permutate non-square images. Mathematically, we describe it as
where (a, b, c, d) are the elements of the transform matrix, (x, y) and (x , y ) are the position of the original image pixel and the mapped image pixel respectively, while m and n are the height and the width of the plain image, respectively. The 2D-RT has an inverse operation when the following condition is met, i.e.,
Note that in the Equation (3), (0, 0) is always mapped into (0, 0). In order to avoid this problem, each position (x, y) can be moved to a random shifted position (x + r m , y + r n ), where random numbers r m , r n ∈ (0, 1). Thus, the improved 2D-RT can be expressed as follows.
And the inverse operation of the improved 2D-RT is expressed as
Based on the the CMT given in Equation (1) and (2) and the transforms proposed in (5) and (6), we describe the proposed RT-enhanced CTM algorithm in detail as follows.
A. ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM
• Step (1): Choose the secret keys, namely decide values for the set {µ i ; x i 0 ; a, b, c, d; r m , r n ; t i = 1, 2, 3}, where µ i and x i 0 are the control parameters and initial values of the CTM system, respective, while t is the iteration round number for permutation.
• Step (2): Read the color plain image P m×n×3 (with notation N = m × n), and denote the three components of P as R P , G P , B P respectively.
• Step (3): Stitch the three components R P , G P , B P together to form a gray image P S m×3n .
• Step (4): Permutate the gray image P S by using Equation (5) for t rounds, and get a permutated image as P RT m×3n .
• Step (5): Split the permutated image P RT into three matrices R RT m×n , G RT m×n and B RT m×n , then further convert these three matrices to three 1D vectors R mn×1 , G mn×1 , B mn×1 .
• Step (6): Iterate Equation (1) for N +1000 times with the parameters and initial values, respectively, and take the final N values to form three chaotic sequences x 1 , x 2 , x 3 of length N .
• Step (7): Calculate three key-streams S i with x i (where i = 1, 2, 3) by Equation (2)..
• Step (8): Encrypt R, G, B by using Equation (7) to obtain their corresponding ciphertexts R , G , B .
where i = 1, 2, · · · , N , while the initial values are
Note in above equations, we used the following definitions, i.e.,R
and δ = (P − P ) × 10 10 mod 256.
andP
• Step (9): Reshape three 1D vectors R , G , B to three matrices R C m×n , G C m×n , B C m×n , and use these three components to compose the final color cipher image C.
B. DECRYPTION ALGORITHM
• Step (1): Receive the secret keys, i.e. set {µ i ; x i 0 ; a, b, c, d; r m , r n ; t i = 1, 2, 3}.
• Step (2): Receive the color cipher image C m×n×3 , and denote the three components of C as R C m×n , G C m×n , B C m×n , respectively.
• Step (3): Iterate Equation (1) for N +1000 times with the parameters and initial values, respectively, and take the final N values to form three chaotic sequences x 1 , x 2 , x 3 of length N .
• Step (4): Calculate three key-streams S 1 , S 2 , S 3 with x = x 1 , x 2 , x 3 by Equation (2), respectively.
• Step (5): Reshape the three matrices R C , G C and B C to three 1D vectors R mn×1 , G mn×1 and B mn×1 , respectively.
• Step (6): Inversely diffuse R , G , B and obtain three new vectors R, G, B, according to the following equation, i.e.
where i = 1, 2, · · · , N .
• Step (7): Reshape R, G, B to three matrices R RT m×n , G RT m×n , B RT m×n , then stitch them to form a gray image P RT m×3n . VOLUME 5, 2017
• Step (8): Inversely permutate the gray image P RT for t rounds with Equation (6) to obtain a un-permutated gray image P S m×n×3 .
• Step (9): Split P S is into three matrices, i.e. R P m×n , G P m×n , B P m×n .
• Step (10): Finally, the deciphered color image P can be composed by whose three channels R P , G P , B P . We would like to mention that in above encryption progress, each ciphertext of plain image is related not only to its plaintext but its former ciphertext, thus a tiny change in any plain image pixel will alter all of the cipher image pixels. Furthermore, in our decryption algorithm, the last pixel value of the decrypted image is unknown because the secret keys do not contain the initial values of R 0 , G 0 and B 0 . These values should be calculated by pixel values of the plain image.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In order to fully demonstrate the advantages of our algorithm, we choose the standard color plain image Lena.bmp with size 256 × 256 × 3 as the testing subject, which is given in Fig. 1 (a) with its histogram (Fig. 1(b) ). The stitched three RGB components is shown in Fig. 1(c) . After applying the proposed 2D-RT for 5 round, the plain image has been permutated as in Fig. 1(d) . Finally, the complete encrypted image and its histogram has been given in Fig. 1(e) and Fig. 1(f) , respectively. As a comparison to the original plain image, the decrypted image and its corresponding histogram are shown in Fig. 1(g) and Fig. 1(h) , respectively.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS A. KEY SPACE
A good encryption algorithm should has a large key space to resist the brute-force attack. Usually, to make a high level security, the key space should be more than 2 100 [18] . The secret keys used in the proposed algorithm can be summarized as:
(1)the parameters of 2D-RT, i.e. a, b, c, d, r m , r n and t; (2)the parameters and the initial values of the CTM, namely µ i and x i 0 , where i = 1, 2, 3.
If the accuracy of the parameters in 2D-RT is 10 2 , the parameters and the initial values of CTM are assumed as 10 15 and do the permutation 5 round, then the key space is 5 × (10 2 ) 6 × (10 15 ) 6 , which is more than 2 100 . Apparently, the RT-enhanced CTM scheme has a large enough key space to resist brute-force attacks.
B. KEY SENSITIVITY
The CTM is extremely sensitive to its mapping parameters and initial values. That is to say, a tiny difference of these values can result in a failure of decryption. In order to test the degree of the secret key sensitivity, we slightly change the one of the initial values x i (0) (i = 1, 2, 3), and get the resulted fail decryption image as shown in Fig. 2(a) with its histogram Fig. 2(b) . Similarly, a slight change in one of the control parameters µ i (i = 1, 2, 3 ) results in the meaningless decryp- tion image as given in Fig. 2(c) with its histogram Fig. 2(d) .
Comparing these results with the correct decrypted image (Fig. 1(g) and 1(h) ), it is clear that the decrypted images with a wrong key are quite different and their histograms are basically balanced.
C. DISTRIBUTION OF THE CIPHERTEXT
An image histogram displays the distribution of the values of its pixels, and it provide some statistical information of the image. However, as can see in Fig. 2(b) and 2(d) , the uniform distribution given in the wrong decryption results reject any statistical analysis attack. 
D. CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF TWO ADJACENT PIXELS
A natural image often exhibits a certain degree of correlation between every two adjacent pixel pair. To avoid statistical analysis attacks, a good encrypted image is expected to hide these correlation information. As a text, 2000 adjacent pixels of the plain image have been randomly selected in the horizontal, vertical and diagonal directions, respectively, and their correlation have been calculated by using the following equation, i.e.
where x, y are the two adjacent pixels sequences, and Fig. 3 shows the correlations of the plain image, and its corresponding cipher image has been displayed in Fig. 4 . It can be observed that the encrypted image has a random-like correlations, which means it successfully hides the correction information of the plain image. Detailed results about this point have been given in Table 1 and compared with some references. We can see that the RT-enhanced CTM scheme outperforms.
E. SHANNON ENTROPY
Shannon entropy [19] is usually used to measure the randomness of the gray values of an image. For an 8-bit image, 8-bit ideal random image, the entropy is 8, which represents that the image pixel values are completely random. A good image encryption scheme should has a cipher image whose entropy is close enough to 8.
Shannon entropy of the different images encrypted by different schemes are listed in Table 2 . Note that the proposed scheme gives the highest Shannon entropy, which means it rarely leak any useful information.
F. ROBUSTNESS AGAINST DIFFERENTIAL ATTACK
Sometimes, attackers make a tiny change in the original plain image, and then encrypts both the original plain image and the changed plain image by the same encryption scheme, and try to find out the relation between plain image and its cipher image by comparing the two encrypted images. We refer to this as differential cryptanalysis. In order to examine whether the proposed encryption algorithm is antidifferential, there are two commonly used indexes, namely the number of changing pixel rate (NPCR) and the unified averaged changed intensity (UACI) [20] . Their definitions are as follows.
where m, n are the height and the width of the image, respectively. Here C and C are the two encrypted images mentioned above and D i,j is computed as
The theoretical values of UACI score is 0.33 [20] . And the closer the NPCR score is to 1, the more sensitive the encryption scheme is to the plain image, and the better the scheme resists differential attack. Let us randomly select a pixel in the plain image and change one bit of the pixel value. Then we encrypt the plain image and the 1-bit changed image. Thus, two cipher images C and C are obtained, respectively, and their NPCR and UACT scores are calculated by using Equation (21).
Some pixels in different positions of the Lena image are chosen to test. Table 3 shows the NPCR and UACI scores when one pixel changes 1-bit of its value. We can see that the NPCR scores are very close to 1 and UACI scores are also close to its theoretical value 0.33. Table 4 compares the NPCR and UACI scores of different encryption scheme for some typical images. From this table, we know that the proposed scheme has a larger NPCR score compared with other schemes, which represents that it scheme can resist stronger differential attack.
G. ROBUSTNESS AGAINST KPA AND CPA
For the proposed encryption scheme, its decryption process depends not only on the correct secret keys but also on the confusion sequences which relate to the plain image. That is to say, when encrypting different plain images, its confusion sequences are different. Thus, decryption can be successful only when the cryptanalyst has the correct keys for each plain image. In other words, the proposed scheme is immune against KPA and CPA.
H. ROBUSTNESS AGAINST CROPPED ATTACK AND TRANSMISSION NOISE
The cropped attack analysis is to check the robustness of the encryption scheme against cropping attacks. And transmission noise analysis is to estimate the robustness of the scheme to the noise during real-time transmission of encrypted images.
Three different cropped encrypted images and one encrypted image contaminated by a Gaussian noise (with zero mean value and standard deviation 0.01) are shown in Fig. 5 (a-d) have been decrypted by the improved scheme using the correct secret keys, and the corresponding decrypted images are shown in Fig. 5 (e-h) . It can be seen that when the encrypted images are cropped or contaminated, their decrypted images are still be recognized, so the improved encryption scheme is roust against cropped attack and noise contamination.
I. ANALYSIS OF SPEED
In practice, a good encryption algorithm is expected to have a quick running speed. A few 24 bits color images of different size have been used as examples to measure the encryption/decryption rate of the proposed image encryption scheme.
Our experiment runs on desktop PC with Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-3470 3.20GHz CPU, 4GB RAM and 500GB hard drive. The operation system and computational platform are Microsoft Windows 7 and Matlab 8.3.0.532 (R2014a), respectively. The average encryption/decryption time taken by the algorithm for processing the images with size 256 × 256, 512 × 512 and 1024 × 1024 are 1.85, 3.76 and 26.34 seconds, respectively. Considering its high level of security, an acceptable running speed is achieved.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, an image encryption scheme based on RT-enhanced CTM has been proposed. Its security analysis has also be given in detail. Experimental simulation and performance comparison with other systems show that this new scheme has greatly improved the security while still possessing all the merits of the pure CTM-based schemes, which obviously leads some practical value in implementation.
